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THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
IN THE VIRGINIAS
WILLIAM C. BEAT=Y*
Lord Kaimes once said that "of all subjects of property, land is
what engages our affections most"' and although he spoke of a day
somewhat earlier than this, his statement has not had it efficacy eroded
by the passage of time. The private ownership of real property is the
rootstock of our capitalistic civilization, and the legal protections
afforded this right have permeated our entire structure of jurisprud-
ence. While the limiting power of the state has been recognized, it
nevertheless has been deemed socially desirable that a possessor of land
be allowed an exclusiveness of possession that will afford a maximum
of use with a minimum of interference from organized society. He may
not, of course, so use his land as to encroach upon the legitimate rights
of others. On the other hand, no one generally has a right to enter his
premises without his consent, and as a general rule he is neither legally
obliged to put his land in safe condition for the reception of inter-
lopers nor is it incumbent that he carry out his activities on the land
in such a manner as not to endanger intruders.
Normally the common law courts have been extremely reluctant
to impose restrictions on the use of real property, but when the social
utility of the individual land occupier's conduct has been outweighed
by the danger of harm to society they have not hesitated to circumscribe
such use. Accordingly, at least four well defined exceptions to the es-
tablished rule of non-liability to trespassers have developed at com-
mon law:
(I) The possessor of land owes a duty to abstain from wilful
or wanton injury to trespassers.2
(2) The possessor of land owes a duty to use ordinary care
under the circumstances to a discovered trespasser.
3
(3) The possessor of land is liable for conditions created by
him in such close proximity to a highway as to be dangerous to
users of the highway.4
*Member of the Huntington, West Virginia Bar.
'As quoted by i Washburn, Real Property (4th ed. 1876) 2 at n. 1.
2See 65 C. J. S. 447.
sHerrick v. Wixom, 8o N. W. 117 (Mich. 1899); Walker's Adm'r v. Potomac,
F. & P. R. Co., 1o5 Va. 226, 53 S. E. nx3 (igo6); Prosser, Law of Torts (1941) 6o9.
4Downes v. Silva, 19o At. 42 (R. 1. 1937); 36 A. L. R. 293; 65 C. J. S. 553.
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(4) The possessor of land who knows that trespassers fre-
quently intrude upon a limited area is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care as to the activities carried on in that area.5
More recently this tendency to balance interests has particularly
manifested itself where small children are concerned. In one pan of the
scale of justice is placed the inherent right of the landholder to an un-
restrained enjoyment of his property and in the other rests the humane
instincts of a society which wishes to preserve childhood so that it
might flower into manhood.6 Thus, to borrow a phrase from Lord
Kaimes, the courts are faced with determining "what engages our af-
fections most." For most of them the bounty of affection would now
appear to be children, and as a direct outcome of this at least two-
thirds7 of the American jurisdictions have engrafted a further ex-
ception on to the non-liability rule by means of a doctrine which fixes
a responsibility on the possessor of realty toward a child trespasser of
tender years whose presence and injury on the premises is foreseeable.
The history of this doctrine, which has now come to be familiarly
known by the misnomer of "attractive nuisance," s presents a chronicle
of confusion and perhaps no proposition of law has caused a greater di-
vergency of judicial opinion. Some of the courts which recognize the at-
tractive nuisance exception frankly admit that it is a policy expedient
conceived out of the necessity of protecting those who are too immature
to protect themselves, and, yet, others accepting it have attempted to
rationalize it on the basis of principles of the common law. About a
dozen jurisdictions, including the states of Virginia and West Vir-
ginia, have found the doctrine untenable and have steadfastly main-
tained that there is no precedent in the common law on which the
doctrine can logically be founded.9 In order to understand this in-
'John P. Pettyjohn & Sons v. Basham, 126 Va. 72, 1oo S. E. 813 (1919); 65 C. J. S.
445.
OSee Shell Petroleum Co. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P. (2d) 777 (1938).
TProsser, Law of Torts (1941) 618.
""'Nuisance' because of a supposed analogy to conditions dangerous to children
in the highway; 'attractive' because it was thought essential that the child be
allured onto the land." Prosser, Law of Torts (1941) 6W8 at n. 14. Calling it a nuisance
begs the question for this is merely another way of saying the law imposes a duty
and as a result the very thing that is necessary to be established is assumed. See
Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission (i898) 11
Harv. L. Rev. 434. This doctrine has also been termed the doctrine of the turntable
cases and has sometimes been referred to as the doctrine of the torpedo cases, but
it is more familiarly known as the attractive nuisance doctrine.
"Those states which now refuse the doctrine, as such, appear to be Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently interpreted Strang v. South Jersey Broad-
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transigency, a consideration of the precedents now becomes imperative.
The leading attractive nuisance case in the United States is Sioux
City and Pacific R. Co. v. Stout.10 There a six year old boy trespasser
was injured while playing upon an unlocked turntable on the property
of a railroad. The instrumentality was located near a travelled road in
a neighborhood where few houses were located. It was shown that an
employee of the railroad had knowledge that boys were inclined to
play on the turntable and that while he was not in charge of the device
he had forbidden the children to play on it, without communicating
his knowledge to his superiors. The injured child recovered a judgment
in the lower court and this was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court on the theory that the railroad had negligently maintained a
dangerous machine which would likely cause injury to children who
could be expected to come to it for amusement. To the allegation that
the plaintiff child was a trespasser and therefore should not recover,
Justice Hunt, speaking for the court replied:
"A reference to some of the authorities on the last suggestion
may, however, be useful.
In the well-known case of Lynch v. Nurdin, the child was
clearly a trespasser in climbing upon the cart, but was allowed
to recover.
In Birge v. Gardner, the same judgment was given and the
same principle was laid down. In most of the actions, indeed,
brought to recover for injuries to children, the position of the
child was that of a technical trespasser.
In Daley v. Norwich and Worchester Railroad Company, it
is said the fact that the person was trespassing at the same time
is no excuse unless he thereby invited the act or his negligent
conduct contributed to it.
In Bird v. Holbrook, the plaintiff was injured by the spring
guns set in the defendant's grounds, and although the plaintiff
was a trespasser the defendant was held liable." '
Nevertheless it has been demonstrated that not one of the four
cases cited in the above passage sustains the liability fixed on the rail-
road under the facts of the case.12 These cases all come within other
rules or within the well defined exceptions that have previously been
casting Co., 86 A. (2d) 777 (N. J. 1952) as holding that New Jersey now accepts the
doctrine. McGill v. United States, C. A.. 3 d, decided January 7, 1953 and as yet un-
reported. However, it must be pointed out that a reading of the Strang case will
not disclose an express recognition of attractive nuisance.
"17 Wall. 657, 21 L. ed. 745 (1873).
"Sioux City and Pacific Railroad v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 660, 21 L. ed. 745, 748
(1875).
2See Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34, 49.
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considered. In Lynch v. Nurdin,13 the first case referred to by Justice
Hunt, the defendant's servant left his cart and horse standing alone in
the public street at the door of a house into which the servant had
entered. During the half-hour absence of the servant several children
gathered about the cart, and the plaintiff, a boy of seven, through
curiosity and without permission climbed aboard. When he started
to get off one of his small companions caused the horse to move. The
boy then fell beneath a wheel of the cart and broke his leg. There is
considerable difference in the facts of this case and those of the Stout
case. Here the boy was not on the land of the defendant, and the cart
was improperly attended in a rather crowded public street where
the child had an equal right to be. In the Stout case the turntable was
on the land of the defendant; it was a legitimate and proper instru-
mentality for carrying on a railroad business; and the child was a
trespasser without any right to be on the premises. Furthermore, Lynch
v. Nurdin probably turned on whether the child had been contribu-
torily negligent, and counsel for the plaintiff conceded the negligence
with little or no discussion of the duty resting on defendant to safe-
guard the child.14 The inference to be gotten from the report is that
the jury decided that the owner of the cart was guilty of negligence
and that the child had acted as prudently as a child could be expected
to act even though he technically trespassed on a chattel. It is import-
ant to notice that there was no trespass upon real property.
Birge v. Gardner,15 whicl was the second decision relied on to sup-
port the court's conclusion in the Stout case, is reputed to have gone
off on the principle that an owner of land cannot so use land near a
highway as to create a public nuisance.16 Undoubtedly the facts giving
rise to the case sustain this theory. A gate was erected on a lane used
as a passage way to the house of the child who was injured. The child,
age seven, shoved and pulled at the gate and as a result the gate fell
on the child breaking his leg. Under these facts the child was possibly
not a trespasser, and in fact, the Connecticut court refused to decide
specifically whether the child was a trespasser.
Another rationale of the case would seem to lie in the remark
that "There is a class of cases, in which defendants have been holden
responsible for their misconduct, although culpable acts of trespassers
by plaintiffs produce the consequences; as in the cases of spring-guns
31 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1o41 (1841).
"'See Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 79 Ad. 858 at 861 (Vt. 1911).
=19 Conn. 507, 5o Am. Dec. 261 (1849).
"See Daniels v. New York and N. E. R. Co., 28 N. E. 283 at 284 (Mass. 1891).
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and man-traps, etc."'1 If the court meant to say that maintenance of
a gate of so fragile a nature that it would fall on a trespassing child
who shook and pulled it was wanton conduct, then clearly the court
was mistakenly trying to fit the case under the well established ex-
ception that a possessor of land owes a duty not to injure a trespasser
wilfully or wantonly.
The third case used by Justice Hunt in the Stout case was Daley v.
Norwich and Worchester Railroad Company,'8 another Connecticut
case. A three year old girl was hurt on the tracks of a railroad company,
but the court felt that if the little girl was a trespasser she was only
technically so and therefore because of immaturity was in reality not a
trespasser. Inasmuch as the authorities depended on by the court were
Lynch v. Nurdin and Birge v. Gardner, it can hardly be said that this
case added anything new in the way of doctrine. However, it must be
emphasized that this was the first American case to present dearly
the issue of trespass to real property without interference of other con-
flicting concepts. Here the child was on the defendant's realty with-
out permission; in the Lynch and Birge cases this had not been so.
The last of the authorities put forth by the Stout case opinion as a
precedent for the turntable doctrine was Bird v. Holbrook. 9 This was
a spring gun case pure and simple. As Judge Peckham pointed out in
Walsh v. Fitchburg R. Co.,20 the difference between the Bird case and
the turntable cases is so plain as to require no discussion. It might also
be observed that the child plaintiff in the case was a mere child of nine-
teen.
Regardless of the insecure basis of the Stout case in precedent, the
die was cast and subsequently the attractive nuisance doctrine, after
suffering reverses, has gradually gained widespread indorsement.21
Courts that approve of the doctrine have been aware of its unstable
foundation, and have suggested various ways to bring it into harmony
wth fixed rules of law. In the main, it has been justified by fictions
of the following sort: dangers on the premises beyond the compre-
17Birge v. Gardner, ig Conn. 507, 50 Am. Dec. 261, 263 (1849).
2Daley v. Norwich and Worchester Railroad Company, 26 Conn. 591, 68 Am.
Dec. 413 (1858).
"4 Bing. 628, i3o Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
"p39 N. E. io68 at 1070 (N. Y. i895).
2 General discussion of the development and acceptance of the doctrine may be
found in Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission
(1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349 and 434; Hudson, The Turntable Cases In The Federal
Courts (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 826; Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34; (1926) 45 A. L. R.




hension of a child constitute a trap; failure to take precautions for
children who might be anticipated amounts to wantonness; the child
has an "implied invitation" to enter and is therefore a licensee; the
child has been enticed onto the premises and hence the possessor is him-
self responsible for the trespass; or the child, because of his immatur-
ity, is not capable of a trespass.
22
The more introspective thinkers have assayed the problem for
what it is-one of balancing of interests. 23 Over fifty years ago Judge
Jeremiah Smith, a vigorous opponent of attractive nusiance, showed
that the doctrine cannot be justified by reference to common law pre-
cedents, Instead, said Judge Smith, the true ground for such decisions
"is policy in the Benthamic sense 'of the greatest good to the greatest
number,' and the advantage to the community, on the one side and
the other, are the only matters really entitled to be weighed." 24
The better authorities among those who approve of the doctrine
now agree with Judge Smith,25 and it has been decided that the "at-
tractiveness" of the instrumentality no longer governs the imposition
of liability.2 The modem doctrine, once the policy of protecting the
child is adopted, is predicated on foreseeability of harm, but there is
at this time no agreement as to what circumstances it should apply to.
The Restatement of Torts contains the best and most concise declara-
tion of the doctrine that has yet been made:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm
to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one
upon which the possessor knows or should know that such
children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows
or should know and which he realizes or should realize as
nFor a discussion of the cases using these fictions see Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34
beginning at 1o9.
2in Shell Petroleum Co. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P. (2d) 777 at 781 (1938) the
true basis of the doctrine was stated to be as follows: "The doctrine presents a
necessity of compromise between the policy of refraining from imposing duties re-
stricting a landowner in the use of his premises, weighed against the harm that
urges the imposition. In one of the pans of the balance is the interest of society in
the safety of its children, and in the other is the inherent right of a landowner in
the enjoyment of his property in connection with economic progress."
-"Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission
(1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 36o.
'See Restatement, Torts (1934) § 339 at p. 925.
"See Gimmestad v. Rose Bros. Co., 261 N. W. 194 at 196 (Minn. 1935); also
Hudson, The Turntable Cases In The Federal Courts (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 826
at 850.
19531
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermed-
dling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous
by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condi-
tion is slight as compared to the risk to young children
involved therein." 27
Although this view prescribes four conditions that must be met
before the doctrine can come into operation, it still leaves much to
the discretion of a particular court in deciding whether or not these
requirements have been met. It is still a subject that is governed to a
great extent by "the judicial heart" and it has been shrewdly ob-
served that "some courts are very humane, almost foolishly so; while
others seems to be constituted of unmarried or childless men-courts
of barons so to speak." 28
With that background, then, let us consider the Virginia and West
Virginia decisions which repudiate the doctrine.
The Doctrine in Virginia
The decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Clark v.
City of Richmond29 presaged the progression of cases that was to ef-
fect the repudiation of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Virginia.
There a six year old boy strayed from a city sidewalk, climbed upon
a low brick wall immediately adjacent to the sidewalk and then pro-
ceeded to fall from it into an excavation being conducted by the city
on the other side of the wall. Recovery was refused and it was said that
the duty of a municipality to maintain its streets could not be extended
"to the protection of children against every sudden freak that may pos-
sess them."30 Plaintiff's counsel asserted that the situation was alluring
and enticing to children and based the claim squarely on the attrac-
tive nuisance theory. However, the court did not then renounce the
doctrine, but merely pointed out that while the Stout case had applied
it, there were no cases, in so far as the court was aware, that had em-
ployed the doctrine to find liability in a fact situation like that pre-
sented by the case at hand.
-Restatement, Torts (1934) § 339.
2Browne, The Allurement of Infants, 31 Am. L. Rev. 891 as quoted in Note
(1925) 36 A. L. R. 34, 39 in the footnote continuing from 38.
2183 Va. 355, 5 S. E. 369 (1888).
383 Va. 355, 5 S. E. 369, 371 (888).
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A number of years after the City of Richmond case was decided,
Virginia's own turntable case arose. In Walker's Administrator v. Po-
tomac, F. and P. R. Co.31 the plaintiff's decedent, a lad of twelve,
mashed his foot while playing without permission on an unlocked
railroad turntable. Again the Stout case was brought forth to demon-
strate that the usual rule of non-liability to trespassers was not ap-
plicable when the intruder was cloaked in the immunity of childhood.
In brief but incisive analysis, Judge Buchanan, speaking for the court,
unmasked the fictions that had been so studiously manufactured to
bring the doctrine into consonance with firmly fixed common law
precepts.
The four cases the Stout case had relied on for support were re-
jected on much the same grounds as have been set out earlier in this
comment. "Those cases," said Judge Buchanan, "come within well
defined exceptions to the general rule that a landowner owes no duty to
a trespasser, adult or infant, except that he must not wantonly or in-
tentionally injure him or expose him to danger."32 The constructive
invitation theory based on Bird v. Holbrook, 3 a spring gun case,
and Townsend v. Wathen,34 a case in which a piece of tainted meat
was deliberately used to entice a dog onto premises for the purpose
of poisoning it, was attacked as a confusion of negligence with inten-
tional wrongdoing. And it was observed that those courts which had
rather glibly quoted the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"
35
as a basis for attractive nuisance were conveniently overlooking the
decisive fact that the maxim refers only to a use that might have del-
eterious effect beyond the boundaries of the land upon which the use
takes place.36 After unmasking these fictions the court concluded that
the attractive nuisance doctrine was not soundly conceived and that
its only base was one of policy. If the demand of new conditions could
not be met by the flexibility of the common law, as it obviously could
not be in the case of the attractive nuisance doctrine, then, said the
court, the challenge must be met by the legislature, not the judiciary.3 7
Oto 5 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113 (196o).
-Valker's Adm'r v. Potomac, F. & P. R. Co., 105 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113, 114
(19o6).
1j Bing. 628, 13o Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
219 East 277, 9 R. R. 553 (18o8).
="So use your own as not to injure another's property."
mAlso see Smith, Liability of Landowners To Children Entering Without Per-
mission (1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 434 at 44o.
3The court seems to be saying that common law courts do not make policy.
But the fact remains that however assiduously they may try to avoid such determi-
nations the common law courts do formulate policy, and the common law has gen-
1953]
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Consequently the Virginia court was put on record as totally rejecting
the doctrine.
By 1913 the anti-attractive nuisance rule was immutable in Vir-
ginia juristic thought and the Supreme Court of Appeals had begun to
cite the Walker case in answer to plaintiffs raising the attractive nuis-
ance argument. In Kiser v. Colonial Coal and Coke Co. it was said:
"In Walker v. Potomac, etc., R. Co., supra (a turntable case
in which an infant was killed), the authorities are reviewed at
length, and the court reaches the conclusion that the rule that a
landowner does not owe to a trespasser the duty of keeping his
land in a safe condition applies as well to infants as to adults."3 8
The Kiser case involved a little girl hardly more than three. The
child lived with her parents in a mining community in a company
house situated near the mine motor road. Her family along with others
in the area were accustomed to using a path which crossed the track
and led to a commissary. Parallel to the track were poles carrying a
small electric wire which had broken several times prior to the casualty
and had generally been repaired in crude fashion by any employee of
the company who by chance came upon the break. Shortly before the
child happened by, the wire broke again at a place about five feet from
the path that crossed the tracks. The little girl wandered from the
path, picked up the charged wire and touched it to one of the rails
of the motor road. The ensuing flash caused by the grounding of the
wire set fire to the child's clothes and she died two days later from the
burns. The court held her to be a trespasser or at best a bare licensee
to whom no duty of pre-vision was owed.39.
The antipathy to the doctrine continued to grow. In Morris v. Pey-
ton40 it was said that "what is known as the doctrine of the Turntable
Cases has been repudiated and very properly so, in Virginia." And
Filer v. McNair asserted that "the doctrine of attractive nuisances
erally established tests of responsibility on the basis of the demands of life in the
social state. An example of this function can be seen in the limitations that even the
property-minded English courts were willing to place on the free use of land in
order to safeguard a trespasser from wilful or wanton injury. Justice Holt in a
dissent in Beacher v. McFarland, 183 Va. 1, 31 S. E. (2d) 279, 281 at 283 and 284
(1944) attempts to fix liability to the child trespasser on the ground that the legisla-
ture had intervened and had fixed a duty by statute.
3115 Va. 346, 79 S. E. 348, 349 (1913).
115 Va. 346, 79 S. E. 348 at 349 (1913).
'0148 Va. 812, 139 S. E. 500, 503 (1927). This case did not turn on the attractive
nuisance principle for the child involved was not a trespasser nor a mere licensee and
the accident did not occur on real property. Instead, the child was jostled off a mov-
ing truck on which he was riding with permission from the driver.
[Vol. X
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does not obtain in this state." 41 But in Richmond Bridge Corporation
v. Priddy42 it became evident that the court would not allow this
aversion to deter it from imposing liability on a possessor of land for
injuries received by a child who had actually been invited on the
premises.
In view of the consistent refusal to accept the attractive nuisance
rule, the remarks of the court, stated by way of dictum, in Town of Big
Stone Gap v. Johnson43 are startling. The town maintained a park for
public recreational purposes. A running track was being graded by
employees of the municipality and at the cessation of work one evening
the driver of a road grader parked it near a playground area in the
part of the park that had been designated for the use of small children.
The driver had hardly left the scene of his day of labor when the cus-
tomary barefoot boys of inquisitive propensity descended upon the
machine. The boys were successful in manipulating the scraper blade
of the grader into a raised position. While one boy held the blade
in the air by means of the foot brake another mounted it for the pur-
pose of riding it on its descent toward the ground. In releasing the
brake, the "brakeman" caught his foot in some cogwheels and was in-
jured.
A statute limited the civil liability of a city or town in the main-
tenance of recreational facilities to cases of "gross or wanton negli-
gence." 44 It was alleged in a notice of motion for judgment against
the town that the exposure of the machine to the inquisitiveness of
childhood was such as to amount to "gross or wanton negligence." The
court specifically stated that:
"The suit of the plaintiff below is grounded on what is com-
monly referred to as the 'attractive nuisance' doctrine. Under
the doctrine one who leaves accessible to small children an in-
strument, machine, or appliance, which he knows, or ought to
know, is attractive to children, and yet is dangerous to them is
guilty of negligence. The two necessary elements of the tort are
that the appliance is known to be attractive to children and
known to be dangerous to them.
"It is not difficult to envision a situation where one or both
1163 S. E. 335, 337 (1932). This, again, was not an attractive nuisance case. The
plaintiff was not a trespasser, but was in his own home where he had a right to be.
'1267 Va. 114, 187 S. E. 518 (1936). Here a company constructing a bridge was
using a portion of a city park with consent of the city. A child playing in the park
was injured when he fell in an excavation that was a part of the construction pro-
ject. The court held that the child had a right to be in the public park and that
he was therefore owed a duty of ordinary care.
'3184 Va. 375, 35 S. E. (2d) 7P 0945).
"See 184 Va. 375, 35 S. E. (2d) 71 at 73 (1945).
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of these elements may be magnified to such a degree that leaving
a particularly dangerous machine or appliance accessible to small
children may constitute gross or wanton negligence. But such is
not the case before us."45
After this statement the court proceeded to show that the town
officials had no knowledge or had no reason to believe the scraper to
be attractive to children. Also there was no proof that the machine
was dangerous to children. Then the court made an assertion that is
astonishing and even redundant if the prior decisions concerning at-
tractive nuisance are to be regarded:
"Whether the act of the town employee in leaving the ma-
chine near the children's playground, under the circumstances
stated, amounted to ordinary or simple negligence we do not de-
cide. It is certain, we think, that it did not constitute gross or
wanton negligence within the meaning of the statute."46
These remarks would imply that if a proper set of facts were to be
presented, the court would apply the attractive nuisance doctrine. If
they do not, then there was no reason for the court to discuss the
elements of the doctrine, and all that would have been necessary would
have been to reiterate that the doctrine did not obtain in Virginia.
However, this case has not been cited or followed. More recently in
Washabaugh v. Northern Virginia Const. Co. the court seems to have
foregone any notion of departing from its previous position and has
once again emphasized that "The doctrine of 'attractive nuisance' or
the doctrine of the 'turntable cases' has been repudiated in this juris-
diction."4
7
The Doctrine in West Virginia
West Virginia, like Virginia, has expressly repudiated the doc-
trine. In Tiller v. Baisden,4 8 Judge Fox, speaking for the court, de-
livered the most recent blow at -the doctrine and while so doing col-
lated the West Virginia cases which disapprove of it. Judge Fox said:
"... It has repeatedly been held by this court that the doc-
trine of attractive nuisance is not recognized in this state. Ritz
v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993; Uthermohlen
vs. Boggs Run Min. and Mfg. Co., 5o W. Va. 457, 40 S. E. 410;
Conrad v. Baltimore 6 Ohio Railroad Co., 64 W. Va. 176, 61 S.
E. 44; Martino v. Rotondi, 91 W. Va. 482, 113 S. E. 76o; Adams,
15184 Va. 375, 35 S. E. (2d) 71, 73 (1945).
'"184 Va. 375, 35 S. E. (2d) 71, 74 (1945)-
'1187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. (2d) 276, 277 (1948). This case turned on the dangerous
instrumentality rule which will be discussed at a later point in this comment.
's128 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 728 (1945).
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Adm'r v. Virginian Gasoline and Oil Co., 1o9 W. Va. 631, 156
S. E. 63; White v. Kanawha City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 34 S. E.
(2d) 17."49
Strangely enough Ritz v. Wheeling,50 the first West Virginia case
on the subject, like the first Virginia case on the attractive nuisance
doctrine, involved a suit against a municipality. In the Ritz case a child
trespasser of less than five was drowned in a city reservoir. Although the
court believed that the city had exercised reasonable precautions
under the circumstances, it, nevertheless, took the opportunity to attack
the policy behind the attractive nuisance doctrine. Since this case is
the first in which the West Virginia court unreservedly puts itself in
the column of those jurisdictions which refuse to apply the doctrine,
extensive quotation from the opinion will be used to give an insight
into the reasons for the court's aversion to the doctrine. The court
summarized the theory of the doctrine and then expressed a dislike for
it in the following manner:
".... The position is sought to be supported by what is called
the 'Turntable Gases' (Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, and
other cases following it). In that case a boy was injured while
playing on a railroad turntable left unlocked, and was allowed to
recover .... But the Stout case, if carried to the length to which
it is sought to be carried, would exact of every property owner
the utmost watchfulness, vigilance, and expenditure to guard
against hurt to children, else he would be every moment in
danger of ruinous damages. It attacks the right of free use of
one's property in lawful business."5'
The court, in continuing to point out the absurdities of an un-
bridled application of the doctrine, said in lucid language:
"And the rule contended for says that, if the thing causing the
injury be attractive or seductive, the liability attends it. How
many things are, or may be, so to children? 'A child's will is the
wind's will.' Almost everything will attract some child. The
pretty horse or the bright red mowing machine, or the pond in
the farmer's field, the millpond, canal, the railroad cars, the
moving carriage in the streets, electric works, and infinite other
things, attract the child as well as the city's reservoir. To what
things is the rule to be limited? And where will not the curiosity,
the thoughtlessness, and the agile feet of the truant boy carry
him? He climbs into the high barn and the high cherry tree. Are
they, too, to be watched and guarded against him? As was well
'01.8 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 728, 729 (1945).
r45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993 (1898).
"45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993, 996 (1898).
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said in Gillespie v. McGowan, oo Pa. St. 144, this rule 'would
charge the duty of the protection of children upon every mem-
ber of the community except their parents.' A very nervous
dutyl..."52
The next case to take up a consideration of the doctrine was
Uthermohlen v. Boggs Run Min. and Mfg. Co.53 There a boy tres-
passer was seriously injured on the defendant's premises when his leg
was caught between a pulley and a cable. No recovery was allowed and
the rule of the Ritz case was reaffirmed. It was pointed out that the
Stout case argument was spent trying to show negligence, seemingly
forgetting that before that question could be reached a duty to the
injured child had first to be established. Again policy seemed to be a
prime consideration for it was said that:
"The doctrine of the Turntable cases shifts the duty of watch-
fulness and care from the shoulders of parents, where the Crea-
tor has placed it, to the shoulders of the land owner using his
property to make a living, and this materially distracts from the
full ownership of property, sacred under our Constitution. It
is an infringement upon the right of property." 54
The third West Virginia case, in point of time, that rejected the
doctrine was Conrad v. Railroad Co.5 5 This case was a true "turntable"
case, for there a twelve year old youngster was injured while playing
on an unlocked and unguarded turntable located in a densely popu-
lated area. The opinion of this case thoroughly considered the doctrine.
The maxims of "sic utere tuo ut alienium non laedas" and "prohibetur
quis facia in suo quod nocere possit alieno"56 were properly rejected
as being inapplicable to trespassers, and the supposed analogy of the
turntable cases to Lynch v. Nurdin57 was denounced because the Lynch
case did not involve an injury received on real property. Notwithstand-
ing the soundness of these legal arguments the court also indulged in
a balancing of interests and found the high regard for property on the
heavy side of the scale when it said:
it would be highly repugnant to our sympathies and
natural impulses to withhold from a crippled child any possible
right the law gives him; but it is not the province of the courts
to make laws, or give rights not conferred by law, and we could
r245 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993, 996 (1898).
55 o W. Va. 457, 40 S. E. 411 (191o).
"5o W. Va. 457, 40 S. E. 411, 414 (1901).
564 W. Va. 176, 61 S. E. 44"(i9o8).
0"It is prohibited to do on one's own property that which may injure an-
other's."
51 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1o41 (1841).
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not do so in this instance without enunciating a principle which
carried to its logical results would impose an extensive and
burdensome restraint upon the dominion of owners over their
own property."' s
The Conrad case was approved by Martino v. Rotondi.59 In that
case an owner of a city lot piled lumber thereon to be used for con-
struction purposes. A small child while playing on the abutting side-
walk was crushed to death when the lumber was dislodged by a play-
mate. The plaintiff contended that it was incumbent upon the de-
fendant to anticipate that children would play on the lumber pile,
and that the defendant was negligent in that he failed to guard against
that contingency. To the court it was plain that the plaintiff was bot-
toming the case on the attractive nuisance theory, and while it was ad-
mitted that some courts sustain the principle, the West Virginia court
took the opportunity to express confidence in the soundness of the Ritz
and Conrad cases.
In Simmons v. Chesapeake ; 0. Ry. Co.,6 0 plaintiff was a nine
year old who lived with his father in a house leased from the railroad.
The railroad maintained a tool house in which explosives were stored
about one hundred fifty feet from the house, and the plaintiff and
his brothers and sisters were accustomed to play around and under the
tool house which rested on a high, unenclosed foundation. One day
while playing, the plaintiff found a shiny dynamite cap under the tool
house. Motivated by the desire to hear the cap explode, but being
totally unaware of the latent force constrained within it, the boy placed
the cap on the rail of the railroad track and struck it with a large bolt.
The ensuing explosion destroyed the sight in one of his eyes.
It was insisted that the railroad was guilty of negligence because
:'64 W. Va. 176, 61 S. E. 44, 46 (1908).
t'91 W. Va. 482, 113 S. E. 760 (1922). It should be noted that Dickinson v. New
River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 76 W. Va. 148, 85 S. E. 71 (1915) also approved
of the Conrad case. The Dickinson case did not discuss the attractive nuisance
doctrine any more than to say that children were on the same footing as adults.
Howerever, the following statement from that case does give an excellent summary of
the policy which dictates the anti-attractive nuisance view in West Virginia: "There
i- moral wrong, even cruelty and inhumanity, in the doing of many things which
the law does not prohibit, and in the failure to do many things which the law does
not require. Such acts and duties are not legally prohibited or imposed, because to
prohibit or impose them would be inconsistent with legal rights on the part of the
actors which, in the opinion of mankind, it would be unwise to impair or burden,
such as rights of property and personal liberty. The law does not assume to regu-
late, govern, or control the conduct of men in all respects, but only so far as the
common good is deemed to require it." 76 W. Va. 148, 85 S. E. 71, 73 (1915).-
6097 W. Va. 104, 124 S. E. 503 (1924).
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it had failed to enclose the tool house and to keep the premises around
it free from explosives. The circuit court in which action was begun
sustained defendant's demurrer to the declaration and then certified the
question to the supreme court. The Supreme Court of Appeals found
that since the father had no right to use the tool shed under the terms
of the lease, the child was a trespasser who had no legal right on the
railroad's premises. The fact that the child was of tender years was
of no consequence and the ruling of the lower court was sustained as
the court again refused to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine.
Shortly after the decision in the railroad case, the court was faced
with a Lynch v. Nurdin6l situation in which a child was injured while
meddling with a road scraper located in a public road. The declaration
filed in Rine v. Morris62 alleged that the defendants were engaged in
constructing a state road and that they had been negligent in allowing
the scraper to remain in an unsafe condition at a place where the child
had a right to be. The defendants claimed that the allegation meant
that the road was unfinished and therefore not open for public use. As
a result the plaintiff was a trespasser to whom the defendants owed only
a duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure. The lower court sustained a
demurrer to the declaration on this basis, and the state Supreme Court
of Appeals upheld the ruling on the authority of the Conrad6 3 case.
However, that court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his declara-
tion so as to show that the road was at the time of injury a public
way. The court used Lynch v. Nurdin to show that a duty exists to
use ordinary care in regard to children who are in places where they
have a right to be. This use of the Lynch case was not at all inconsistent
with the previous position of the court, for it will be remembered that
in the Conrad case the court denied that the Lynch case was analogous
to the turntable cases on the ground that the turntable doctrine was
an attempt to impose a duty to care for conditions existing on private
premises whereas Lynch v. Nurdin involved actions in a public place.
Consequently the Rine case holding is eminently sound and does
not in any way weaken the anti-attractive nuisance rule.
Again in Adams v. Virginian Gasoline & Oil Co.64 it was repeated
that attractive nuisance is repudiated in West Virginia. Then more
recently in White v. Kanawha City Co., a case of a drowning in an
ai Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
'99 W. Va. 52, 127 S. E. 908 (1925).6 Conrad v. Railroad Co., 64 W. Va. 176, 61 S. E. 44 (19o8).
M 1 o9 W. V. 63, 156 S. E. 63 at 66 (1930).
[Vol. X
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
artificial pool, an attempt to invoke the doctrine was assailed as a
futile gesture because "that doctrine is not enforced or recognized
in this state." 65
The Dangerous Instrumentality Rule
Upon the surface the courts of Virginia and West Virginia would
appear to be composed of "childless men-barons so to speak," but the
fervent protestations of aversion for attractive nuisance emanating
from these courts are deluding if considered in isolation. For closely
akin to the attractive nuisance doctrine is the position maintained in
these jurisdictions that one owning or in control of something on his
premises which may legally be considered a dangerous instrumentality
will be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to use due care
for the protection of child trespassers who might be injured by the
instrumentality. 6° In order for the doctrine to apply, the presence of
the trespassing child must (a) either be known67 or must have been
reasonably anticipated s and (b) the danger of the instrumentality must
be hidden, concealed or latent when handled by one unfamiliar with
its use.09
Under this rule it has been held that powder,ro gasoline,71 and
electric wires72 are dangerous instrumentalities, while fire,73 barbed
'127 W. Va. 566, 34 S. E. (2d) 17, 19 (1945).
01A brief discussion of this rule is given in 13 Michie's Jur., Duty Owed Trespas-
sers on Premises § 16. Many of the Virginia and West Virginia decisions on the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine are also collated in this section.
07Daugherty v. Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. (2d) 119 at 120 (1940); Adams v.
Virginian Gasoline & Oil Co., 1o9 W. Va. 631, 156 S. E. 63 (1930), first syllabus by the
court.
cXashabaugh v. Northern Virginia Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. (2d) 276 at
278 (184 8); Daugherty v. Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. (2d) 119 at 120 (1940); Par-
sons v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 115 W. Va. 450, 176 S. E. 862 at 864 (1934);
Wiseman v. Terry, 111 W. Va. 620, 163 S. E. 425 at 429 (1932); Adams v. Virginian
Gasoline & Oil Co., 1o9 IV. Va. 631, 156 S. E. 63 (193o), first syllabus by the court.
OWashabaugh v. Northern Virginia Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. (2d) 276 at
277 (1948); Tiller v. Baisden, 128 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 728 at 730 (1945); White
v. Kanawha City Co., 127 IV. Va. 566, 34 S. E. (2d) 17 at '9 (1945)-
7cDaugherty v. Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. (2d) iig at 120 (1940); Wiseman v.
Terry, 111 W. Va. 620, 163 S. E. 424 (1932).
"'Adams v. Virginian Gas & Oil Co., 1o9 W. Va. 631, 156 S. E. 63 (1930). An oil
tank with a covered top was not a dangerous instrumentality in Richards v. Hope
Construction 9- Refining Co., 121 W. Va. 650, 5 S. E. (2d) 81o (1939).
7'Parsons v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 115 W. Va. 450, 176 S. E. 862
(1934).
7'TilIer v. Baisden, 128 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 728 (1945). New Jersey has held
that fire is a dangerous instrumentality. See Piraccini v. Director General of Rail-
roads, 112 Ad. 311 (N. J. 1920).
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wire,74 or a raft on a quarry pond73 have been held not to be. These
latter agencies, in the eyes of the courts of the Virginias, differ from
the former in that the danger is so clear that even a child of tender
years can readily observe and recognize it. On the other hand electric
wires or powder and the like appear innocuous when viewed from the
eyes of a child. The danger inherent in powder becomes patent only
when the match is struck; the electric wire is deadly only when the
circuit is closed allowing the charge to surge through; and the toxic
vapors of gasoline become manifest only when the liquid is enclosed.
To put the proposition in other words, the danger in each of the
named instrumentalities is not apparent or obvious. Accordingly
whether a duty will be imposed upon a landholder to "take precautions
for the safety of children depends upon whether the danger to which
they are exposed is open, obvious, natural and common to all or
whether it is hidden and latent."
76
It is evident that the dangerous instrumentality rule is remarkably
similar to the attractive nuisance doctrine.77 In fact one West Virginia
case has gone to the extent of saying that "the principles upon which
the doctrine of 'attractive nuisance' rested seem still to underlie the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine."78 But the West Virginia court
has, in Tiller v. Baisden also indicated that the dangerous instrumen-
tality rule is a theory apart from the attractive nuisance doctrine,70
and the Virginia case of Daugherty v. Hippchen has spoken of a gen-
eral rule which demands that one who keeps a dangerous instrumen-
7'Beacher v. McFarland, 183 Va. 1, g1 S. E. (2d) 279 (1944).
bWashabaugh v. Northern Virigina Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. (2d) 276
(1948). In White v. Kanawha City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 34 S. E. (2d) 17 (1945) the
West Virginia court said that artificial pools of water are not in themselves danger-
ous. See also Note (1949) 8 A. L. R. (2d) 1254 at 1287.
7OWashabaugh v. Northern Virginia Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. (2d) 276, 279
(1948).
7In the Restatement, Torts § 339, comment on clause (a), it is stated in part that
"The duty of the possessor, therefore, is only to keep so much of the land upon
which he should recognize the likelihood of children trespassing, free from those
conditions which, though observable by adults, are likely not to be observed by
children, or which contain risks the full extent of which an adult would realize
but which are beyond the imperfect realization of children. It does not extend to
those conditions the existence of which is obvious even to children and the risk
of which is fully realized by them." These words were written to explain the Amer-
ican Law Institute's views on attractive nuisance, but they provide an apt epitome
of the dangerous instrumentality rule.
7Richards v. Hope Construction & Refining Co., 121 W. Va. 650, 5 S. E. (2d) 81o,
811 (19g9).
7128 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 728 at 730 (1945). This collates the West Virginia
cases applying the doctrine.
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tality on his premises must exercise a degree of care toward immature
child trespassers commensurate with the danger involved.8 0 This same
principle has been referred to as general law by the West Virginia cases
of Colebank v. Coal and Coke Co.81 and Wellman v. Fordson Coal
Co. 82 Regardless of this, such a general rule cannot be sustained on any
other basis than the atractive nuisance theory, and an analysis of the
authorities on which these cases rely conclusively shows that the danger-
ous instrumentality rule is no more than an adjunct of that doctrine.
The courts of both states have erroneously depended to a large ex-
tent upon the authority of the Minnesota case of Mattson v. Minnesota
& N. W. R. Co.83 and upon the Michigan case of Powers v. Harlow
5 4
to show the separate existence of a general rule placing a possessor of
land under a duty to safeguard trespassing children against dangerous
instrumentalities on his premises.8 5 And yet, neither of these cases will
support that proposition. The Mattson case86 rests squarely on the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine and if that doctrine be unacceptable then
the ratio decidendi of a case turning on it cannot be approved. This
same argument may also be directed against Powers v. Harow87 for
80175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. (2d) ig9 at iao (194o).
6io6 W. Va. 402, 145 S. E. 748 at 750 (1928). The Colebank case distinguished
Simmons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 97 W. Va. 104, 124 S. E. 503 (1924), supra
page 33 of this comment, on the ground that disaster was not to be foreseen from
the dynamite cap in that case. However, this distinction is not sound, for the Sim-
mons case contains all the elements necessary to fix liability under the dangerous
instrumentality rule. This inconsistency further demonstrates the non-existence of
the so-called dangerous instrumentality rule.
2io5 W. Va. 463, 153 S. E. 16o at 161 (1928).
"95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443 (19o).
853 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257 (1884).
'Although the Virginia Court has not specifically cited these two cases it has,
nevertheless, relied on authority based upon the decisions in those cases. In Daugh-
erty v. Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. (2d) 119 at 121 (1940) the ct. cites Smith v.
Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P- (2d) 785 rehearing denied 48 P. (2d) 76o (1935),
a case which emphasizes the Mattson view. The Daugherty opinion also refers to
Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 434 which contains summaries of both the Mattson and
Powers cases. It is interesting to consider that while this A. L. R. note professes not
to cover cases dealing with the attractive nuisance doctrine at least ten of the cases
cited to show the existence of the so-called general rule are attractive nuisance cases.
Many of these are based on the Mattson and Powers decisions while the remainder
can be distinguished on the basis of well-known exceptions to the non-liability to
trespassers rule.
The West Virginia court cites the Mattson and Powers cases in Wellman v.
Fordson Coal Co., 1o5 W. Va. 463, 143 S. E. 16o at 162 (1928). And in Colebank v. Coal
& Coke Co., io6 W. Va. 4o2, 145 S. E. 748 at 750 (1928).
13 See Mattson v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443 at 445
(19o.5)
B'See Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co., 12 N. E. 451 at 458 (Ohio 1887).
19531
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
that case is thought by some to have turned on the attractive nuisance
principle as did the Mattson case. Furthermore, even if this be incor-
rect, it would appear that the injured child in the Powers case was on
the premises by right, and hence the case is not controlling as to a situa-
tion involving a trespasser.88
Much of the misapprehension as to the existence of a separate
dangerous instrumentality rule may be traced directly to Thompson's
Commentaries on Negligence where it was said that the cases uphold-
ing a duty to child trespassers proceed on one of two grounds:
"1. That where the owner or occupier of grounds brings or
artificially creates something thereon which from its nature is
especially attractive to children, and which at the same time
is dangerous to them, he is bound, in the exercise of social duty
and the ordinary offices of humanity, to take reasonable pains
to see that such dangerous things are so guarded that children
will not be injured by coming in contact with them.
2. That although the dangerous thing may not be what is
termed an attractive nuisance,-that is to say, may not have an
especial attraction for children by reason of their childish in-
stincts,-yet where it is so left exposed that they are likely to come
in contact with it, and where their coming in contact with it is
obviously dangerous to them, the person so exposing the danger-
ous thing should reasonably anticipate the injury that is likely
to happen to them from its being so exposed, and is bound to
take reasonable pains to guard it so as to prevent injury to
them."8 9
The second ground put forth above has been taken to mean that
there is a separate foundation for the dangerous instrumentality rule,
independent of the attractive nuisance doctrine. However, it would ap-
pear that Thompson was endeavoring to show that there were situa-
tions where an instrumentality could not be deemed attractive to chil-
dren but where nevertheless great risk of harm could be foreseen to
children who might be expected to come into contact with it. Thus
he early recognized that the principle of the turntable cases could be
extended to embrace non-attractive dangerous instrumentalities as
well as those which are especially alluring to the inquisitorial tech-
niques of the prying youngster, and his statement is entirely in accord
8See Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257 at 259 and 260 (1884). Also
Simmons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 97 W. Va. 104, 124 S. E. 503 at 504 (1924).
S Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (2d ed. igoi) § 1o3o. The
Nevada court in Smith v. Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P. (2d) 785 at 788 (1935)
quotes from this passage to show the existence of the so-called general rule. The




with the more modern authorities who now agree that the ingredient
of attraction in the so-called attractive nuisance cases is of importance
only in showing that a trespass is to be expected.90 Thompson was not,
to borrow an horticultural analogy, saying there were two trees; he was
merely pointing out that there were two limbs to the same tree. This
interpretation is substantiated by the fact that Thompson relied ex-
pressly on Lynch v. Nurdin9' for authority for his statement. 92 In other
words the supposed general rule that the Virginia and West Virginia
courts here followed is based on the very same legal considerations
that those courts have so adamantly opposed when presented under the
guise of attractive nuisance. The difference is in name only. There-
fore, the dangerous instrumentality rule becomes in actuality only a
modification or adjunct of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 93 It is an
attempt to reach a middle ground between the Draconian rule of non-
liability and the preposterous absurdities of an unbridled application
of the attractive nuisance doctrine. But however laudable and humane
such an effort may be, it is still untenable when based on cases like
Lynch v. Nurdin94 and its successors. Moreover, the persistent denun-
ciation of the attractive nuisance doctrine by the courts of the Vir-
ginias creates a strange anomaly-a sort of "now you see us now you
don't" proposition, in which counsel for the plaintiff, in order to sus-
tain a position under the dangerous instrumentality rule must rely
on cases decided in attractive nuisance jurisdictions with the threat
always impending that they will be informed that the attractive nuis-
ance doctrine does not "obtain in this State."95 On the other hand de-
fence attorneys cannot be safe in merely arguing that the attractive
nuisance doctrine is repudiated in these jurisdictions and they too
must resort to the cases of those jurisdictions that have embraced the
OOSee Restatement, Torts (1934) § 33 -
11 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
121 Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (2d ed. 19oi) § 1042.
"Some of the earlier cases on the rule in the Virginias cannot be said to rely
on the attractive nuisance principle, but the decisions in each of those cases can be
justified on grounds separate from any showing of dangerous instrumentality. In
Lynchburg Tel. Co. v. Bokker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S. E. 148 (xgo5) a child was injured
by an electric wire dangling near the public side walk. This might well have been
termed a dangerous condition existing in close proximity to a public way. Likewise
Haywood v. South Hill Mfg. Co., 142 Va. 761, 128 S. E. 362 at 363 (1925), another
electric agency case that is often considered an application of the rule, would appear
to turn on the highway exception. In Wellman v. Fordson Coal Co., 1o5 W. Va. 463,
143 S. E. 16o (1928) where powder was declared to be a dangerous instrumentality, the
child was on the premises as an invitee. See Note (1928) 35 W. Va. L. Q. 91.
041 Q. B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1o41 (1841).
6Filer v. McNair, 158 Va. 88, 163 S. E. 335, 337 (1932).
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doctrine to show that a particular instrumentality has or has not been
ruled to contain hidden danger for children of immature years. It
would seem that a more definite standard should be adopted-perhaps
that of the Restatement of Torts that was set out earlier in this com-
ment.9 6 In that manner these courts could cease dealing in idle sophis-
tries97 and frankly admit that because of humanitarian policy con-
siderations they have deemed it advisable to follow a modified attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine.
OSee supra this comment pages 25-26.
OThe New Jersey Supreme Court, which has consistently repudiated the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine, resorted to the Restatement of Torts § 339 (the attractive
nuisance section) to sustain its position that fire constitutes a dangerous instru-
mentality. See Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N. J. 38, 86 A. (!!d) 777
(1952). The court had previously reached the same conclusion in Piraccini v. Director
General of Railroads, 112 Atl. 311 (N. J. 192o) under a dangerous instrumentality
rule quite similar to that followed in the Virginias. In the Strang case it was said
that the principle of Piraccini controlled, but the court relied heavily on the Re-
statement and cited Lynch v. Nurdin for the concept that the foreseeability of harm
to a child trespasser is the basis of liability. Nowhere in the opinion was the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine mentioned, but the court has, without saying so, delineated
the modern view of that doctrine. Judge Goodrich in McGill v. United States, C. A.
3d, January 7, 1953, as yet unreported, has held that the Strang case now puts New
Jersey into the column of states accepting the attractive nuisance doctrine. The New
Jersey situation is a striking parallel to that in the Virginias.
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